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SCIENCE, RELIGION AND THE NEW HUMANISM
BY VICTOR S. YARROS
T N reviewing the 1926 meeting of the British Association for
^ the Advancement of Science, Professor Julian Huxley, grand-
son of the great Professor Thomas E. Huxley, laid particular
stress as to the marked tendency in the addresses and discussion
to apply the method of science to political, social and economic
problems and at the same time to adopt "a humanistic scale of
values", or, in other words, to apply to the solution of such
problems the principles of "scientific humanism."
Professor Huxley is not the only prominent exponent of this
"scientific humanism". In a new book Science and the Modern
World^ described by many philosophical critics as "epoch-making",
Professor A. N. Whitehead repeatedly speaks of the same scien-
tific movement, attaches to it great significance, and connects it
with his own important doctrine of "organic mechanism".
What, let us ask, is scientific humanism and what organic
mechanism? What is novel and vital in either of these doctrines
or attitudes? What are their respective contributions to the
stock of modern ideas, scientific and philosophical?
Let Professor Julian Huxley furnish a few introductory re-
marks to the attempt at interpretation and comment that is to
follow. He wrote:
"Broadly speaking, there exist two main competing Weltauss-
chauungen in current thought—that which, however, modified, is a
survival of the religious-philosophical outlook of the later Middle
Ages, and another more realist system of which different partial
manifestations have been the humanism of the Renaissance, the
rationalism of the eighteenth century, and the modern scientific
outlook. However, it is only in very recent years that this system
could become even approximately complete. Before Darwin it
could not take in the realm of living things; before the rise of
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psycholog}^ it could not link up with the study of mind ; before the
rise of anthropology and sociology, human behaviour and human
institutions were beyond its grasp. The Renaissance humanism was
incomplete because it took little account of Science ; the eighteenth-
century rationalism had not yet understood the limitations of rea-
son; and the scientific philosophy of the late nineteenth century
was seeking to compress all phenomena into the categories pre-
scribed by physics and chemistry."
The new, the realistic and humanist system of thought, we
are assured, takes into due account both the limitations and the
highest potentialities of the human spirit. Its humanism is not
sentimental or arbitrary, but strictly scientific, while its science
is not dry, narrow, thin, prosaic, but rich, warm, humanistic.
These are large claims, and they should not be accepted with-
out adequate support.
In the first place, it appears, scientific humanism and organic
mechanism are at war with the old so-called "scientific material-
ism" and take the position that spiritual and religious values are
as real and vital as the values recognized by the exact sciences.
Professor Whitehead says, for example, that "In regard to the
aesthetic needs of civilized society the reactions of science have
so far been unfortunate. Its materialistic basis has directed atten-
tion to things as opposed to values. This misplaced emphasis
coalesced with the abstractions of political economy, which are in
fact the abstractions in terms of which commercial life is carried
on. Ultimate values were excluded."
As to religion, science has been either openly hostile or in-
different toward it, yet Professor Whitehead says "the fact of
the religious vision, and its history of persistent expansion, is
our one ground for optimism. Apart from it human life is a
flash of occasional enjoyment lighting up a mass of pain and
misery, a bagatelle of transient experience".
Finally, as to appreciation of beauty and of the variety and
richness of value, Professor Whitehead writes:
"There is something between the gross specialized values of
the practical man and the thin specialized values of the mere
scholar. . . . When you understand all about the sun and all
about the atmosphere and all about the rotation of the earth,
you may still miss the radiance of the sunset. There is no sub-
stitute for the direct perception of the concrete achievement of
a thing in its actuality. We want concrete fact with a high light
thrown on what is relevant to its preciousness."
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We are told by Professor Whitehead expressly and by implica-
tion, in a hundred different variations, that the man of science
and the rationalists and skeptics of the 19th century were too
materialistic, too narrow, too cold and too contemptuous of religion,
of aesthetics, of philosophy and of the humanities.
It is permissible at this point to ask on what evidence such
sweeping assertions as these can possibly be based. Certainly Dar-
win, Huxley, Spencer, Tyndall, Wallace, Haeckel, Lyell, Comte,
Harrison and the philosophic utilitarians were not hostile or in-
different to philosophy, art, moral values and even to sincere
religious speculation. None of the thinkers named were "ma-
terialists" ; they knew and insisted that matter and spirit are
merely convenient zvords descriptive of unknown if not unknow-
able entities. If they were agnostics, it was because they did not
care to pretend to the possession of knowledge they did not have,
or to use words without definite meanings. They never dreamt
of disputing the necessity of high lights on concrete facts if the
high lights zvere available. They never denied the importance of
research and reflection in the hope of obtaining high lights. They
never sinned against the beauty, the preciousness, the significance
of things in all their ascertainable actuality.
Still, if they missed something vital that was or is knowable
or known, or at least, accessible, it is but just to emphasize that
fact and to correct their incomplete and erroneous ideas or gen-
erahzations.
We turn, accordingly, to Professor Whitehead's positive doc-
trine, to his "alternative philosophy of science in which organism
takes the place of matter." Here it is in a nutshell.
Science is becoming the study of organisms. There are plenty
organisms in nature which are incapable of further analysis. A
primary organism is the emergence of some particular pattern
in the unity of a real event. Of course, the conception of an
organism includes the concept of the interaction of organisms.
The event has an intrinsic and extrinsic quality ; the event is
something in itself and at the same time it is related to, and
modified by, other events. Value emerges by reason of the vari-
ous entities constitutive of the event and their togetherness, while
the importance of the value of an event depends on the property
called endurance or reiteration. There is a pattern in the event
regarded as a totality and there is a pattern in each part of the
event. No value can be ascribed to the underlying activity ; it
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is found only in the matter of fact events of the real world.
Ideal situations are devoid of intrinsic value, but are valuable as
elements in purpose.
"An individual entity, whose own life-history is a part within
the life-history of some larger, deeper, more complete pattern, is
liable to have aspects of that pattern dominating its own being,
and to experience modifications of that larger pattern reflected
in itself as modifications of its own being."
For example, the individual in society is a real entity related
to other entities and modified by them. He may feel the reac-
tions of the other entities, and of the social organism as a whole,
as a modification of his own being. His value arises out of his
own particular personality and quality, and qualities as acted upon
by other personalities and as reacting to them and to himself.
There is a pattern of human conduct which is at once individual
and social. The value of a given moral action or omission is
concrete, not abstract, yet we can think of ideal situations as
mirrors of a purpose. We cannot improve individual conduct or
social relations unless we have a pattern to guide us, and that
pattern cannot be imposed from without.
These propositions are very abstract and difficult, but the
difficulty is due more to Dr. Whitehead's style than to the quality
and character of his ideas. What he mans to stress throughout
the argument is the existence of purpose and pattern in and be-
hind events, so that neither cosmic nor human existence is a
result of mere chance. It follows that if we wish to live up to
the purpose and pattern, we must understand events in their in-
trinsic as well as extrinsic relations, and as part of other events,
Value is nonexistent apart from organic patterns, enduring, re-
current patterns. Science may isolate and study only this or
that aspect of the organic mechanism, but it must not overlook
the essential pattern, the organism, in and behind the aspects.
What are the implications of the doctrine thus summarized,
and what legitimate deductions are to be drawn therefrom?
One of the most important deductions is that the search for
values cannot be left to the sciences alone, but must be participated
in by philosophy and by religion. Another deduction is that there
is no conflict between human ethics and cosmic ethics, and that our
ideals and our noblest conceptions are as real and valid as the
things dealt with by the physicists, chemists and biologists.
Talk of lower and higher elements in human nature is contrary
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to the doctrine of organic mechanism. Evolution for man, is the
increasing manifestation of an original pattern and the ever more
successful adaptation to the social environment. Materialism, says
Professor Whitehead, somehow suggested struggle for existence,
selfishness, aggression, division, indifference to the weak and un-
fortunate. Organic mechanism suggests co-operation, sympathy,
solidarity, pursuit of the common good and of visions of moral
beauty and harmony.
It is interesting to glance at Dr. Whitehead's definitions of
religion and God as arrived at from the standpoint of his phi-
losophy or organic mechanism. "Religion," he writes, "is the vision
of something which stands beyond, behind and between the pass-
ing flux of immediate things ; something which is real and yet
waiting to be realized ; something which is a remote possibility and
yet the greatest of present facts ; something that gives meaning to
all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension ; something whose
possession is the final good and yet is beyond all reach ; some-
thing which is the ultimate ideal and yet the hopeless quest."
"Religion is the reaction of human nature to its search for
God. . . . The immediate reaction of human nature to the re-
ligious vision is worship. . . . That vision claims nothing but
worship, and worship is a surrender to the claim for assimila-
tion, urged with the motive force of mutual love. . . . That
religion is strong which in its ritual and its modes of thought
evokes an apprehension of the commanding vision."
And what have the exponents of organic merchanism and
scientific humanism discovered in their search for God? Pro-
fessor Whitehead objects to the paying of "metaphysical compli-
ments" to God. If, he says, God is conceived as the foundation
of all ultimate activity, then the fatal difficulty presents itself
that such a God is the origin of evil as well as of good. The
supreme ruler of a drama is responsible for the weaknesses of
the drama as well as for its merits. No ; God is to be con-
ceived as "the ultimate Limitation", "the ultimate or rationality".
God is not concrete, but he is the ground for concrete actuality
;
the nature of God is the ground for rationality. He is the
supreme ground for limitation and for value ; it is within his
nature to divide the good from the evil and to establish reason
within her proper dominions.
Professor Whitehead adds that "what further can be known
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about God must be sought in the region of particular experiences,
and therefore rests on an empirical basis".
But how can particular experiences and empirical facts help
us to understand the ultimate irrationality and the ultimate limita-
tion? How can things interpreted by reason and logic throw
any light on the nature of God, for which "no reason can be
given?" And why talk of good and evil in connection with
irrationaHty ?
We fear that Professor Whitehead is not clear in his own
mind on the subject of the scientific conception of God. He
seems to contradict himself in recognizing an empirical basis for
something that cannot he grasped and conceived, or in talking
of ultimate ideals at the end of a hopeless qnest. Hopeless quests
lead nowhere.
We confess we are unable to perceive any advantage in Dr.
Whitehead's definition of God over the older definition of an un-
knowable, incomprehensible, inscrutable power whence all things
proceed. We confess, further, that the "value" of the White-
head definition from any ethical or social point of view is
negligible, if not actually negative. It is impossible to zuorship
Dr. Whitehead's God, impossible to imagine his relation to nature
or the relation of nature to him—or it. One cannot worship or
pray to an abstract metaphysical formula. Frankly, once you
give up the naive, anthropomorphic notion of God—the supreme
ruler of all things, the creator of all things, the cause of all
things, the final arbiter of all things, then the conception or
theory of God is shorn of all moral and practical value. We may
assume a purpose and meaning in nature and a source of that pur-
pose and meaning. We can form no notion of the purpose
or of its source, though as metaphysical abstractions both may
serve dialectic ends. But worship, prayer, communion, and the
like imply a totally different notion of God, and it is idle to
attempt a denial of that fact.
On the other hand, what is there in what is now often sneered
at as "Nineteenth century rationalism" or "Naive agnosticism" that
stands in the way of full acceptance by the agnostics and free-
thinkers of scientific humanism? To reject Dr. Whitehead's
conception of God is not necessarily to embrace a crude, narrow
mechanical theory of the universe. One may reject both mechan-
ism and vitalism on the simple, common-sense ground that neither
term really means anything. Neither alleged conception explains
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reason, instinct, morality, altruism, self-sacrifice, ideals of great
men, noble deeds of common and simple men. Scientific humanism,
to be scientific, must be based on observed facts, not on meta-
physical abstractions or strained subtleties. To say that science
is "reverting" to humanism is to misrepresent the situation. At
no time has true science been anti-humanistic. It was sheer and
egregious misapprehension to impute the evolutionists, for ex-
ample, the belief in a ruthless struggle for existence, or in a
cold, unimaginative, unsympathetic commercialism. The ethics of
the evolutionary thinkers and the philosophical utilitarians were
never lower than the ethics of the theologians or the meta-
physicians.
It is true, however, that some men of science are today taking
a deeper and greater active interest in rehgion and in philosophy
than did all their predecessors. This is a healthy tendency, since
both religion and philosophy have everything to gain, and nothing
to lose from such interest, and since men of science are bound
qua men of science,—to determine whether or not religion and
philosophy pursue scientific methods and have something more
than baseless fancies and guesses to offer to humanity.
After all, religious thinkers must deal with religious ex-
periences and religious phenomena, and must deal with such
precisely as men of science deal with the phenomena and ex-
perience of the physical world. You can talk about "mysteries'".
for another millennium without advancing by one inch the cause
of religion. Advancement is possible only where the facts are
better studied, where the body of facts is constantly increased by
new observations and where theories are formed carefully to
account for the known facts. If, in addition to science, we can
enrich ourselves by developing a scientific religion and a scien-
tific philosophy, so much the better for humanity. Meantime it
is important to recognize the truth that humanity, beauty, moral
progress are not dependent upon any particular religious con-
ception, but are quite compatible with agnosticism and a sus-
pension of judgment concerning the origin, significance and value
of certain sentiments and emotions called religious. We may
change terms and interpretations without changing a single fact
or ignoring a single bit of evidence.
There is, alas, reason to fear that the new humanitarians and
the exponents of the theory of organic mechanism have not taken
the pains to re-read and restudy the views of the thinkers of
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the 19th century. This, in truth, is the irritating and great diffi-
culty with most writers on religion and philosophy. They fight
windmills ; they set up little straw figures and proceed to knock
them down ; they imagine opinions and debit their opponents with
them in order to refute those opinions with an air of virtuous
triumph. There is something new and perhaps valuable in organic
mechanism, but that something is not epoch-making or revolution-
ary. As to scientific humanism, it seems to be nothing but an
alluring phrase that represents no novel or positive idea. Human-
ism is scientific and science can be and has been an instrument
of goodness and beauty. Science can be used destructively by
predatory and malicious men, but so can common sense. There
would be little hope for civilization and progress if science were
not humanistic.
